Abstract-In this paper, we investigate the artificial noise-aided jamming design for a transmitter equipped with large antenna array in Rician fading channels. We figure out that when the number of transmit antennas tends to infinity, whether the secrecy outage happens in a Rician channel depends on the geometric locations of eavesdroppers. In this light, we first define and analytically describe the secrecy outage region (SOR), indicating all possible locations of an eavesdropper that can cause secrecy outage. After that, the secrecy outage probability (SOP) is derived, and a jamming-beneficial range, i.e., the distance range of eavesdroppers which enables uniform jamming to reduce the SOP, is determined. Then, the optimal power allocation between messages and artificial noise is investigated for different scenarios. Furthermore, to use the jamming power more efficiently and further reduce the SOP, we propose directional jamming that generates jamming signals at selected beams (mapped to physical angles) only, and power allocation algorithms are proposed for the cases with and without the information of the suspicious area, i.e., possible locations of eavesdroppers. We further extend the discussions to multiuser and multi-cell scenarios. At last, numerical results validate our conclusions and show the effectiveness of our proposed jamming power allocation schemes.
Jamming-Aided Secure Communication in Massive MIMO Rician Channels legitimate receiver becomes sharper and the power leakage to other directions becomes trivial in massive MIMO systems, it is doubtful whether jamming is still beneficial for secrecy, and 2) as the number of antennas grows, the dimension of the jamming space increases and jamming power needs to spread over a large number of directions, which makes conventional uniform jamming inefficient with massive MIMO. Regarding these issues, two questions are raised:
1) Does conventional uniform jamming still benefit the secure communication in massive MIMO systems when N t goes to infinity? 2) Is there more efficient scheme rather than uniform jamming in the massive MIMO setup?
In this paper, we will answer these two questions by making the following contributions:
• For the massive MIMO Rician fading channels, we analytically describe the secrecy outage region (SOR) as geometric locations of eavesdroppers that can induce secrecy outage. The concept of SOR further has been used to characterize the secrecy outage probability (SOP).
• With the information of the suspicious area where eavesdroppers are possibly located, we derive analytical expression of the SOP in the presence of one legitimate receiver and multiple passive eavesdroppers. After that, it is proved that conventional uniform jamming is still useful in terms of reducing the SOP when any eavesdroppers are located within a certain distance range to Alice, which we call it as the jamming-beneficial range. This conclusion provides an answer to the first question.
• For uniform jamming, the optimal signal and jamming power allocation is investigated for different scenarios. We further devise practical directional jamming algorithms, either with or without the information of the suspicious area. The proposed directional jamming schemes use the jamming power more efficiently to further and substantially reduce the SOP, which provides answers to the second raised question.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II provides system model. Section III describes the SOR, further provides an analytical expression of SOP and a jamming-beneficial range. Optimal jamming power allocation is studied for uniform jamming in Section IV, and in Section V, directional jamming algorithms are proposed. In Section VI, the SOR is discussed for multiuser and multi-cell scenarios. Section VII concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first present the network model. As an important concept in subsequent analysis, we further define the normalized crosstalk between two wireless links and introduce its characteristics. Then, the AN-aided secure transmission and the definition of SOP are described.
A. Network Model
We consider the network shown in Fig. 1 , where a transmitter (Alice) equipped with N t antennas transmits to a single-antenna user (Bob) in the existence of L external passive single-antenna eavesdroppers (Eves 1, . . . , L). Alice uses beamforming for the data transmission to Bob, while jamming with AN in other spaces (or directions). We define the set of receivers I r = {b, e 1 , . . . , e L } where b denotes Bob and e l (l = 1, . . . , L) denotes Eve l. Considering Rician fading, the channel between Alice and receiver i is given by
where K i is the Rician K-factor, g i ∈ C N t ×1 is the i.i.d. fast fading part whose elements follow CN (0, 1) distribution (complex normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance). 
where θ i is the LOS angle of receiver i. In addition, we consider large scale fading d
where d i is the distance from Alice to receiver i, and α is the path loss coefficient.
We 
B. Normalized Crosstalk
For h i , h j (j ∈ I r ) defined as (1), the following asymptotic results hold as N t → ∞ [32] :
where . = denotes the approximation that is asymptotically accurate, 1 
Stemming from (5), we introduce the following definition.
Definition 2 (Normalized Crosstalk): Define the normalized crosstalk between nodes i, j as Proof: See Appendix A.
C. Secrecy Transmission Scheme
We use linear precoding for data transmission, while AN symbols s n are sent in the space defined by v n , n = 1, . . . , N, to degrade the channels of Eves. For the null space-based jamming [29] , it holds that N = N t − 1 and v n ∈ null(h b ). The received signal at receiver i is given by 1 In this paper, we focus on the large antenna regime, and will use equalities instead of approximations for brevity.
where w b ∈ C N t ×1 is the precoder for Bob, x b is the unit-norm data symbol, and n i is the additive Gaussian noise. Moreover, P b andP n respectively are the powers allocated to Bob and the n-th jamming direction, with total power constraint such as N n=1P n = P tot − P b where P tot is the total available transmit power. We define the jamming power allocation coefficient as
For ease of description, we assume that Bob and all Eves share the same noise covariance being N 0 . Moreover, we consider maximum ratio transmission (MRT) for precoding of the data symbol x b , i.e., w b = h b ||h b || . In this case, according to (8) , the SINR at receiver i is given by
We assume that the Eves are not colluding, but consider the most-capable Eve, which has the maximum receive SINR, to define the secrecy rate as [23] 
where SINR e,max max l SINR e l and [x] + max{x, 0}. We say a secrecy outage occurs if R s b is less than a target rate R th , hence the SOP is defined as
III. SECRECY OUTAGE ANALYSIS
In this section, we first introduce the secrecy outage region (SOR) which describes all possible locations of Eves who can cause secrecy outage. Analytical expression of the SOR is derived for uniform jamming, then the SOP is studied with variant shapes of R sus . At last, a jamming-beneficial range is derived to show that uniform jamming is still useful in reducing the SOP.
A. Secrecy Outage Region
In the large antenna regime, all fast fading effects are completely averaged out as shown in (4) and (5) . Therefore, whether the secrecy outage occurs or not, will be essentially determined by the geometric location of Eve. In this light, we introduce the SOR defined in the following.
Definition 3 (Secrecy Outage Region):
The SOR is defined in terms of polar coordinates as
Herein, we note that R s b is a function of θ e and d e .
In (15) where, and hereafter, we use the notationsP b =
for brevity. Note that in (15) , s e;b (θ e ) is the normalized crosstalk between Eve and Bob as defined in (6) . Considering fixed θ b , we hereafter write s e;b as a function of only θ e .
Proof: Since span(v n ) = null(h b ), jamming causes no interference at Bob. Applying (4) to (10), we get (14) .
By applying (6), the numerator of (16) can be written as
On the other hand, noting that w b and v n , n = 1, . . . , N t − 1 constitute a complete orthogonal basis of the N t -dimensional vector space, we have
n=1 |h e w n | 2 = ||h e || 2 − |h e w b | 2 = N t (1 − s e;b (θ e )) in the denominator of (16) . Therefore, (15) can be obtained.
Remark 1: The result in (14) leads to a constraint on φ (defined in (9)), written as
which stems from the fact that the jamming power cannot be too large, otherwise, even without Eves, the target rate R th cannot be guaranteed since the remained signaling power is too small. Unless otherwise specified, we assume (17) can always hold via proper power allocation. From Lemma 2, we characterize the SOR for the uniform jamming as follows.
Proposition 1: With uniform jamming in null(h b ) and given φ, the SOR is described as
and C 3 (φ) is given by (22) (as shown at the bottom of the page). Proof: Substituting (14) and (15) into (11) and using the definition of SOR in (13) 
Clearly, to have smaller SOR, we expect to reduce bothd uj e,0 and θ max . To minimized uj e,0 in (23), we need to minimize
this results in a maximized C 3 (φ) (correspondingly, a larger θ max ), which is not desired. It is clear that a trade-off in φ exists in balancing the effects of bothd uj e,0 and θ max , which can be formulated as jamming power allocation problems, as described in the following sections.
At last, by setting φ = 0 in Proposition 1, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 1: Without jamming, i.e., φ = 0, the SOR can be found as
where the superscript (·) nj stands for "no jamming".
Proof:
The corollary is directly obtained by setting φ = 0 in Proposition 1.
Differently from (18), the constraint on s e;b (θ e ) vanishes in (26) , indicating that the SOR now is extended to the entire angular domain. Moreover, compared with (23), we see that d e,0 in no-jamming case, 3 on the contrary, is reduced compared to uniform jamming. In conclusion, uniform jamming induces two opposite effects: the beneficial one is that the SOR can be squeezed in angular domain, and the disadvantage is that the SOR is enlarged in Bob's direction, i.e., the main lobe. Illustration of the SOR changing caused by jamming will be shown later in simulations.
B. SOP Analysis
With a single Eve uniformly distributed in R sus , using the derived SOR, the SOP is given by
where Area(·) denotes the area of a certain geometric region. Considering that there are L Eves uniformly distributed in R sus , the SOP of the entire network can be written as
From (27) , the SOP is determined by the overlapping area between two geometrical regions. If R SOR (φ) ∩ R sus = ∅, zero SOP is achieved. Recalling (3), as well as (23) and (25), two sufficient conditions of R SOR (φ) ∩ R sus = ∅ can be written as
whered e,0 is defined in (23) and θ max is in (25) . The physical insight of (29) is clear: when an Eve is far away or its angle difference to θ b is large, it does not cause outage.
For the general case with arbitrary shape of R sus , P out in (27) can be numerically evaluated and further applied to jamming power allocation design. However, due to the nonregular shapes of R SOR (φ) and R sus , closed-form expressions of Area(R SOR (φ) ∩ R sus ) as well as the SOP in (28) do not exist for the general case. Yet, by considering constant boundaries of R sus as described in Definition 1, (27) can be written in an integral form as the following proposition. 
where F s e;b (·) is defined in (7). Proof: For the ease of analytical description, herein we utilize the CDF of the normalized crosstalk in (7). First, rewrite (12) as P out = 1 − Pr{R s b ≥ R th } and recall (11), we have
where
(·) is the CDF of SINR uj e,max , which is given by
L since all Eves are independently distributed. Using (15), we have
where both θ e and d e are random. Since θ e and d e are independent, (32) can be presented as
is the PDF of d e , corresponding to the uniform distribution between two boundaries defined by
Then, P out is directly obtained as (30) . Practically, (30) can be used for jamming power allocation. As stated in Remark 1, Alice can arbitrarily adjust the value of the constant boundaries in the design, based on the information about R sus that she has. Particularly, if Alice knows nothing about R sus (i.e., she assumes A e = [0, 2π] and D e = [0, r max ]), minimizing P out becomes equivalent to minimizing Area (R SOR (φ)).
C. Jamming-beneficial Range
Based on Proposition 2, we find a jamming-beneficial range defined in d max (i.e., the larger constant distance boundary of R sus ) as follows.
Proposition 3: A constraint on d max that makes the uniform jamming beneficial in reducing the SOP is given by
where s max e;b is the largest feasible crosstalk value defined in Lemma 1.
Proof: See Appendix B. Moreover, we note that (34) has a similar form of that described for the SOR without jamming, i.e., R nj SOR in (26) . Recalling the definitions of the largest distance of SOR in (23) and (24), the physical insight of Proposition 3 can be explained as follows: as long as R sus ∩ R nj SOR = ∅, there always exists an optimal φ, with which the SOP can be reduced by uniform jamming, compared with the SOP without jamming. The optimization of φ is discussed in the next section.
IV. JAMMING POWER ALLOCATION
In this section, considering uniform jamming, we investigate the optimal jamming power allocation that minimizes the SOP. The problem can be simply described as
In practice, Alice may have different accuracy levels of information about R sus as follows:
1) Alice knows nothing about the suspicious area, or only partial information about the suspicious area such as A e only (or D e only); and 2) Alice knows exact information about the suspicious area, i.e., both A e and D e . For these two cases, we respectively investigate the jamming power allocation in the following.
A. Jamming with None/Partial Information about R sus
When Alice knows nothing about R sus , minimizing the SOP becomes equivalent to minimizing the area of SOR, which can be calculated as 
where I is the set of the concerned side lobe indices, determined by either A e or D e . Using (36) (or (37)) along with (19) , the areas can be numerically calculated and the optimal φ can be easily founded via one dimensional linear search. Since it is difficult to derive closed-form expression for Area R 
where C 1 (φ) and C 2 (φ) are defined in (20) and (21) .
Proof: See Appendix C. Remark 3: In (38), it is shown that the area of every side lobe is inversely proportional to N t , indicating that the SOR side lobes can asymptotically vanish with ultimately large N t . Moreover, it is inversely proportional to m 2 , which means that the area of the SOR will rapidly decrease for the side lobes with large indices, i.e., with large angle difference to θ b . This result indicates that Eves from different directions (i.e., within different side lobes) have different significance in causing secrecy outage, hence should be treated differently in the jamming design.
B. Jamming with Exact Information of R sus
With the information of R sus , Alice can calculate and apply the value of P out in the design (at least numerically), 4 using either (28) or (30) . Although in practice, (35) can be readily solved by one dimensional linear search, it fails to provide the optimal φ in closed form. In the following corollary, we provide closed-form solutions and discussions for a special case.
Corollary 3 (Jamming Power Allocation for Given θ e ): For constant boundaries of R sus and given θ e , which is equal for all Eves, the optimal φ can be determined as
Proof: See Appendix D. Note when φ opt = φ opt g , the optimal jamming power decreases with d b and s e;b (θ e ), whereas it will increase when φ opt = φ 0 . The part that dominates the final result in (39) depends on the value of θ e . Detailed discussions will be provided in Section VII along with simulations.
V. DIRECTIONAL JAMMING
In this section, we propose directional jamming algorithms to allocate jamming power more efficiently than uniform jamming, based on the following facts: 1) With the information of R sus , Alice can perform jamming only to the suspicious directions instead of the entire null space of h b . 2) Without information of R sus , jamming towards different directions also needs to be treated differently, as stated in Remark 3.
At a cost of slightly increasing the implementation complexity compared with uniform jamming, directional jamming is able to substantially reduce the SOP. In following subsections, we present power allocation algorithms for directional jamming with and without the information of R sus .
A. Directional Jamming with the Information of R sus
When jamming is not uniformly performed, from (10) , the SINR at Eve is represented as
where V ∈ C N t ×N is the matrix that spans the jamming space, with the n-th column vector being v n , andp = (P 1 , . . . ,P N ) T , whereP n is the power allocated to the n-th jamming direction as defined in (8) . Correspondingly, the SOR now can be described as
,s(·) was defined in (2). The superscript (·) dj stands for "directional jamming".
Design directional jamming using (42) induces high complexity especially when N is large, since changing any element in the N-dimensional vectorp requires re-calculation of R dj SOR (p). Hence, we alternatively propose a two-step suboptimal power allocation method for directional jamming in Algorithm 1, which firstly find the optimal jamming power assuming uniform jamming, then reallocate it directionally based on a criterion of jamming subspace selection. In Step 2, P out can be calculated numerically using (28) or (30) Since R sus is defined by physical angles, it is necessary to set up a mapping between the jamming space and physical angle to concentrate the jamming power towards R sus . We propose a heuristic subspace selection method for Step 3. First, map v n to physical angle as
After that, P opt jam is equally reallocated to the beams whose indices are
The power allocated to each beam is now
In practice, v n is not necessarily in null(h b ) and an alternative is to find v n as the column vectors of a N t -dimensional DFT matrix for the following reasons; 1) selected columns of the DFT matrix can form a good substitute of null(h b ), as N t → ∞ [35] ; 2) using pre-defined DFT basis as the jamming space avoids channel inverse calculation, which induces high computation complexity especially when N t is large [30] ; and 3) most importantly, the structure of DFT matrix provides very sharp beam pattern towards the physical angle θ v n in (45), therefore, the beam selection criterion (46) can be very efficient since with sharper beams, there will be less jamming power leaked outside of R sus .
B. Directional Jamming without Information of R sus
Without any information of R sus , the objective of directional jamming power allocation becomes to minimize the area of R 
A general closed-form expression of (47) is not available, and its convexity is unknown. Hence, numerically minimizing Area R dj SOR (p) is NP-hard. To overcome this, we propose Algorithm 2, which iteratively finds the optimal n-th element ofp while keeping the others fixed.
Algorithm 2 provides a sub-optimal solution which reduces the complexity by degrading the original problem to one-dimensional linear search. However, for large N t , the complexity is still huge since during each main iteration, 
4: end for 5: if ||p j −p j−1 || ≥ ε then 6: j = j + 1; go to step 2. 7: else if ||p j −p j−1 || < ε then 8: return 9: end if With Algorithm 3, jamming is performed in only two dominating directions in the neighborhood of θ b , for the reasons that 1) for the region with large angle difference to Bob, allocating much jamming power is inefficient since R nj SOR in this region is generally very small; 2) for the directions highly in-line with θ b , jamming should be avoided as it will cause severe interference to Bob. Note that for every realization of φ, only single time of linear search is required in Step 4. The complexity is irrelative to N (which is large in general), hence can be greatly reduced compared to Algorithm 2. As a possible extension, more than two dominating directions can be involved in the design while the trade-off between complexity and performance exists. We focus on the single-cell and single-user scenario in previous sections. In this section, we now show how the SOR can be affected by multiple users and cells. We also provide discussions on the design of secure transmission in these scenarios with future research challenges.
A. Multiuser Transmission
When multiple legitimate users (i.e., multiple Bobs) are presented in massive MIMO systems for Rician channels, the multiuser interference between Bobs is trivial as long as their LOS angles have large difference, which can be readily ensured via user scheduling. On the contrary, the multiuser interference to Eves can be seen as equivalent jamming considering that single-user decoder is adopted at Eves, which is likely to happen when Eves are low-cost devices. Hence, when multiuser beamforming is applied for Bobs, the received multiuser interference at Eve becomes equal to the directional jamming, transmitted towards other Bobs' directions. Consequently, the SOR of an objective Bob will be shrunk in the directions of the other Bobs. Denote the set of all legitimate users as I MU r = {b 1 , . . . , b U }. Similar to (43) and (44), which describe the SOR for directional jamming, the SOR of user b u ∈ I MU r in the presence of multiple users can now be described as
. . , U, u = u spans the signaling space for the other legitimate users, while V j ∈ null(W b ) is the jamming space. Correspondingly, the power allocation vector can be divided into two parts as Considering communication secrecy for the entire multiuser transmission system, the optimization problem can be reasonably re-formulated as a min-max problem such as
The main challenge in solving (51) is that allocating power for one user affects the SORs of other users. Hence, the power needs to be jointly allocated for all users, and the complexity of such joint optimization can be very high. Hence, it is desirable to develop simplified algorithms for the multiuser scenario.
B. Multi-cell Network
In multi-cell massive MIMO networks, it is commonly assumed that the training pilots are reused among cells. Correspondingly, pilot contamination results in imperfect CSI estimation as well as nonnegligible multi-cell interference from Alices in adjacent cells. Denote θ . Thereby, the SOR in these directions can be shrunk and the shape can be non-continuous in these regions.
A general analytical description of the SOR in the multicell network is challenging, since it is determined not only by the network topology, but also by the locations of all pilotcontaminating users in adjacent cells. Moreover, the complicated shape of the SOR makes difficulties in calculating and minimizing the corresponding area. Nevertheless, in practice, pilot scheduling and reuse schemes can be utilized to alleviate these adverse effects which are caused by pilot contamination, e.g., [36] , [37] .
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
Simulation results are shown in this section. We set d 0 = 0.5, α = 3, P tot = 1 W, N 0 = 10 −5 mW and for simplicity, assume strong LOS environment such that K e;b → 1. In this parameter setting, the receive SNR is 20 dB when the transmitter-receiver distance is 100 m. At first, using (23) and (24), Fig. 2 provides a description of R uj SOR (φ) in terms of the radius of the main lobe/side lobes. It is shown that the radius of the main lobe is monotonously increasing with φ, indicating that reducing the signal power towards θ b enlarges the SOP in this direction. Clearly, allocating additional jamming power to the direction of θ b will further enlarge this radius, which suggests that jamming directly in the legitimate user's direction should be avoided. This conclusion coincides with the concept we followed for the design of Algorithm 3.
Moreover, as φ increases, the radius of the second side lobe is reduced first and then increases after a certain value, e.g., φ ≈ 0.7, indicating an optimal jamming power allocation in terms of minimizing the SOP in this direction. The side lobes with index m ≥ 3 can be completely eliminated with proper jamming. The results show that we can design jamming based on the partial information of R sus . For example, in Fig. 2 , if we know that Eves are located in the direction ranges of side lobes with indices larger than 3, then, allocating φ = 0.2 is enough to secure the communication and the remaining power can be allocated to data transmission.
Next, we depict the SOP vs. φ in Fig. 3 , with randomly generated θ e and d e within the range A e = [−15 • , 15 • ] and D e = [50 m, 100 m], respectively. Note that the smoothless of the curves is not due to the lack of simulation trials, but caused by the fact that P out is a piecewise function, as shown in (7) and (30) . In addition, the SOP rapidly increases to 1 when φ exceeds φ max in (17) . From Fig. 3 , we can see that 1) the SOP with optimal φ is much smaller than that without jamming, i.e., φ = 0, as anticipated in Proposition 3; 2) the SOP decreases as N t increases since larger N t results in higher received power at Bob and less leakage to Eve. Moreover, the optimal φ increases with N t because with larger N t , allocating more power to data transmission is not efficient in increasing the achievable rate of Bob because of the logarithmic slope of the rate function; and 3) the SOP is further substantially reduced with directional jamming. Fig. 4 shows the optimal jamming power coefficient φ opt as a function of the normalized crosstalk s e;b , for uniform jamming. We compare the derived φ opt in (39) with Monte Carlo simulations and show a good match between them. From  Fig. 4 , we first observe that each curve is divided into two parts, respectively representing that φ 0 or φ opt g dominates the optimal result in (39). The division is emphasized using a vertical dash line for the case with d b = 150 m. When d b = 100 m, in the φ 0 -dominating region, the curves with N t = 50 and 100 m coincide with each other since N t does not affect φ 0 in (41). In the φ opt gdominating region, φ opt increases with N t with given s e;b . The region-division in Fig. 4 can be explained as follows: in the left region, s e;b is small enough so the channels between Eves and Bob can be considered as asymptotically orthogonal, i.e., h e ∈ null(h b ). In this case, more signal power is leaked to Eve with larger s e;b , hence we need more jamming power allocated in null(h b ) to degrade Eve's channel. However, in the φ opt gdominating region, the value of s e;b is large, which indicates that channels from Alice to Eves and Bob could be highly aligned, i.e., h e / ∈ null(h b ). In this case, jamming in null(h b ) is not efficient to degrade Eve's channel and the jamming can be a waste of transmit power. Thus, the optimal jamming power starts decreasing with s e;b . In Fig. 5 , for the case that without information of R sus , we compare the area of SOR achieved by different algorithms. For uniform jamming, the optimal φ is found via one dimensional linear search by minimizing the area described in (36) . For all curves, the SOR enlarges with increasing d b , since larger d b results in weaker signal power received at Bob. With uniform jamming, the area of the SOR can be reduced approximately by half compared with the non-jamming case. This considerable reduction of SOR area together with the least implementation complexity make uniform jamming still a good option for practical system design. Using the directional jamming with Algorithm 2, the SOR area can be further reduced, but it induces the highest complexity among all schemes. At last, we note that for the directional jamming, Algorithm 3 achieves slightly larger area of SOR than Algorithm 2, where the difference becomes smaller especially for small d b . However, the implementation complexity can be greatly reduced by Algorithm 3, which makes it being a reasonable choice that strikes a compromise between complexity and performance. It can also be confirmed from . Four schemes are compared, i.e., without jamming, uniform jamming, and directional jamming schemes Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 3. Correspondingly, we also depict the SORs achieved by each schemes in Fig. 7 to help us better understanding the relation between the SOR and SOP. We note that in Fig. 6 , the smoothless of the curves is caused by the area calculation of the intersection between two complicated-shaped regions, not by the lacking of simulation trials.
As shown in Fig. 6 , all jamming schemes can achieve lower SOP compared to that without jamming. In the small-d b region, directional jamming schemes outperform uniform jamming. However, the performance improvement from uniform jamming to directional jamming Algorithm 1 is small because Algorithm 1 directionally allocates jamming power towards R sus to suppress the SOR side lobes (as shown in Fig. 7(c) ), whereas when Bob is close to Alice, most side lobes are already very small with uniform jamming. Moreover, in the small-d b region, directional jamming Algorithm 3 achieves the lowest SOP for the reason that it focuses on only two dominating SOR side lobes (as shown in Fig. 7(d) ) hence the jamming power can be used more efficiently in Algorithm 3 than Algorithm 1, where jamming is uniformly performed to all directions within R sus . In this example, the two dominating side lobes are covered by R sus , thereby they contribute more in the SOP calculation compared with the other side lobes. However, in a different scenario where R sus does not cover the two dominating side lobes, it cannot be concluded that Algorithm 3 always outperforms Algorithm 1.
At last, we note that as d b increases, the performance of Algorithm 3 degrades and Algorithm 1 outperforms the others. The reason is, when d b is large, all SOR side lobes correspondingly become large as shown in Fig. 7(d) . In this case, besides the two dominating side lobes, the impact from the other side lobes cannot be simply ignored as that has been done in Algorithm 3. In conclusion, in practice, appropriate jamming scheme should be determined according to both the available information of R sus and the location information of Bob such as d b .
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first define and analytically describe the SOR for secure communication in massive MIMO Rician channels, and derive expressions of the SOP. We then determine a jamming-beneficial range, indicating that uniform jamming is useful in reducing the SOP when the distance from Eve to Alice is less than a threshold. Optimal jamming and signal power allocation is investigated for uniform jamming, furthermore, for both conditions with and without the information of the suspicious area, we propose directional jamming algorithms, which makes use of the jamming power more efficiently and further reduce the SOP. We further extend the discussions to multiuser and multi-cell scenarios where future challenges are also described. In conclusion, we claim that uniform jamming still helps the communication secrecy in massive MIMO systems, and the proposed directional jamming outperforms conventional uniform jamming schemes. 
By applying [31, (14) ] to t i;j in (6), s(x) in (52) can be represented as
which is a sinc-like function, has one main lobe and side lobes with decreasing amplitudes.
Proof of 2):
In order to describe the CDF of s i;j , we first characterize s(x) in (53) by some cross points and peak values, shown in Fig. 8 and defined in the following. can be approximated by
which is obtained by noting that sin(x) ≈ x when x is small, and it becomes asymptotically exact as N t is large. PV 0 = 1 corresponds to the main lobe. • Cross Points: Using (52), we have F s i;j (K i;j u) = Pr{s( i;j ) < u}. According to Fig. 8 , Pr{s( i;j ) < u} can be evaluated by calculating the probability that i;j falls within the discrete intervals determined by CP m,i (u) and CP 0 (u). On the other hand, recalling that i;j | sin θ i − sin θ j | and θ i follows uniform distribution, the CDF of i;j can be written as
Using F (z) to describe the probability that i;j falls within the described intervals leads to (7) . Proof of 3): Given θ j , the feasible range of i;j is determined by A i , i.e., the angle range that node i distributed in. Use X A i to denote this feasible range (shown in Fig. 8 
Since F s e;b (·) is an increasing function, P out decreases with t in the domain of F s e;b (·). Therefore, if the following conditions are satisfied, we can conclude that jamming is beneficial.
1) There exists a positive value ofP jam , which holds t − t 0 > 0 for any z ∈ D e ; and 2) z ∈ D e such that t 0 < s max e;b where condition 1) defines the scenario, in which jamming can always result in a larger t than t 0 (corresponding to the no-jamming case), thereby leading to lower P out since it is a decreasing function in t. Moreover, condition 2) ensures that t 0 is less than the maximum feasible value of s e;b , otherwise, P out is always zero either with or without jamming under condition 1), hence the benefits of jamming cannot be concluded. For 1), it is equivalent to prove that
has a positive solution ofP jam . Note that with proper parameter setting that φ is no larger than φ max described in (17), we have a 1 > 0 and a 2 > 0, and note that if
then z α < a 2 holds for any z. In this case, (58) can be equivalently rewritten asP 
Here, according to Lemma 1, we have s max e;b ≤ 1. Hence, the intersection of (59) and (61) is equal to (61), and recalling the definition of a 2 leads to the final result.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
First, from (52), (53), s e;b (θ e ) in the m-th side lobe can be presented as
In (62), sine functions appear in both the numerator and denominator, making it infeasible to obtain closed-form results in further analysis. Hence, we find an upper bound of (62) by fixing the value of x to the left end point of its domain, i.e., x = m N t d , in the denominator.
For the ease of description, we consider only the condition that θ e > 0. With θ b = 0, we can rewrite x (defined as x = | sin θ e − sin θ b |) in terms of θ e as
Note that the side lobes that are close to the main lobe are more important in contributing to the area of the SOR, as a result, the value of θ e that should be concerned is very small. Therefore, the upper bound in (64) can be very tight. Combining (63) and (64) we have
Substitute (65) into (19) , and calculate the area by integral, we get is not the only choice since the solution of d 0 (φ, θ e ) = d min (if exists), denoted as φ 0 , also achieves zero SOP. Therefore, we need to check the value of φ 0 and compare it with φ opt g to determine the final optimal jamming power allocation. Note that in (72), the value of g 1 (φ) is usually much less than g 2 (φ). Hence, when s e;b (θ e ) is not so large, g(φ) can be well approximated by a linear function as g(φ) ≈ s e;b (θ e )h(P tot ) − (1 − s e;b (θ e ))P tot φ.
Using this approximation, we get φ 0 = 
By checking the Hessian matrix, it is easy to show that the objective function in (75) is concave. To minimize a concave function, clearly, the optimal solution can be found only on the boundaries of the domain defined by (76). Recalling that the area of the side lobes decreases rapidly with larger lobe index, and being aware that jamming should be avoided within the main lobe to prevent degrading Bob's channel, we further simplify the problem by checking the boundary of the domain as described in (48). According to these discussions, Algorithm 3 is obtained.
